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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Autism  is a developmental  condition,  characterized  by difﬁculties  of social  interaction  and communica-
tion,  as  well  as  restricted  interests  and  repetitive  behaviors.  Although  several  important  conceptions  have
shed light  on speciﬁc  facets,  there  is  still no  consensus  about  a universal  yet  speciﬁc  theory  in terms  of  its
underlying  mechanisms.  While  some  theories  have  exclusively  focused  on  sensory  aspects,  others  have
emphasized  social  difﬁculties.  However,  sensory  and  social  processes  in  autism  might be interconnected
to  a higher  degree  than  what  has  been  traditionally  thought.  We  propose  that  a mismatch  in  sensory
abilities  across  individuals  can  lead  to difﬁculties  on  a social,  i.e. interpersonal  level  and  vice  versa.  In this
article, we,  therefore,  selectively  review  evidence  indicating  an interrelationship  between  perceptual  and
social difﬁculties  in  autism.  Additionally,  we  link  this  body  of research  with  studies,  which  investigatewo-person psychophysiology
ultilevel account
redictive coding
the  mechanisms  of action  control  in  social  contexts.  By  doing  so,  we  highlight  that  autistic  traits  are
also  crucially  related  to  differences  in  integration,  anticipation  and  automatic  responding  to  social  cues,
rather than  a  mere  inability  to  register  and  learn  from  social  cues.  Importantly,  such  differences  may  only
manifest  themselves  in  sufﬁciently  complex  situations,  such  as  real-life  social  interactions,  where  such
processes  are  inextricably  linked.
© 2017  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND
license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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. Autism: is it a social or a sensory condition?
Autism is a pervasive developmental condition, which is char-
cterized by difﬁculties in social interaction and communication,
and, second, a group of non-speciﬁcally or less social (hereafter, for
simplicity, non-social) aspects (e.g. Huerta et al., 2012; Fitzgibbon
et al., 2013). Indeed, the vast majority of hypotheses during the lasts well as restricted interests and repetitive behaviors. This short
eﬁnition already suggests that autism’s cardinal characteristics
all into two broad categories, ﬁrst, a collection of social aspects
∗ Corresponding authors at: Independent Max  Planck Research Group for Social
euroscience, Max  Planck Institute of Psychiatry, Munich, Germany
E-mail addresses: dimitris bolis@psych.mpg.de (D. Bolis),
eonhard schilbach@psych.mpg.de (L. Schilbach).
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.dcn.2017.01.009
878-9293/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article 
/).decades have mainly focused on facets either belonging to the one
or the other of these two categories.
For instance, on the non-social side, the weak central coherence
hypothesis considers autism as a different, detailed-oriented cog-
nitive and perceptual style (Frith, 1989; Happé and Frith, 2006).
More precisely, it claims that people with an autism spectrum
disorder (ASD) tend to process information locally, rather than
globally. According to this idea, people with ASD perceive the world
differently in a number of aspects such as visual and auditory infor-
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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ation. Similarly, the executive dysfunction hypothesis (e.g. Hill,
004) focuses on difﬁculties that people with ASD face when it
omes to executive functions, i.e. problems with functions such
s planning, ﬂexibility, inhibition and working memory. On the
ther hand, one of the ﬁrst theories focusing on speciﬁcally social
spects of the condition, the Theory of Mind hypothesis (Baron-
ohen et al., 1985) proposed that individuals with autism lack a
peciﬁc meta-representational capacity, namely a “theory of mind”,
hich prevents them from inferring other people’s mental states,
uch as beliefs, emotions or desires. Later, it was  suggested that
mplicit and spontaneous mechanisms of mentalizing might be the
nes that are primarily linked to relevant difﬁculties in autism,
ather than explicit processes as initially believed, which might
e more easily compensated for through strategic learning (Senju
t al., 2009; Schilbach et al., 2011). A second theory focusing on
he social dimension emphasizes a special category of neurons,
hich are thought to be active both when an action is performed
nd observed (Di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Rizzolatti and Craighero,
004). This broken mirror neuron hypothesis of autism proposes
hat impaired social skills in autism are related to dysfunctions
n the putative human mirror neuron system making it difﬁcult
or individuals with autism to simulate and thus understand oth-
rs’ behavior (MNS; Altschuler et al., 2000; Ramachandran and
berman, 2006). Some studies have offered supportive evidence
or the involvement of the MNS  (e.g. Perkins et al., 2010). However,
oth the validity of a broken MNS  and a direct, causal relationship
etween the MNS  and social skills in autism, have been challenged
y other reports (e.g. Southgate and Hamilton, 2008). Differences
n MNS  activation between neurotypical individuals and persons
ith an ASD could be alternatively traced back to potential mod-
latory effects of the so called “mentalizing system”, a set of brain
egions known to subserve explicit mental state attribution (e.g.
ang and Hamilton, 2012; Cook and Bird, 2012; Dumas et al.,
014a). Yet again, the social motivation (SM) hypothesis focuses on
otivational rather than cognitive aspects (Chevallier et al., 2012).
t proposes that people with autism lack the social drive inherent to
on-autistic individuals, which would assist them in exploiting the
ecessary learning opportunities in social interactions in order to
evelop relevant expertise in social cognition. More precisely, this
ypothesis is settled upon the fact that the propensity to initiate
ocial contacts, social orienting, social seeking and liking, appears
o be diminished in ASD. This idea, however, is brought into ques-
ion by evidence, which suggests that individuals with autism are
n fact interested in social interaction and exchange, but only when
he interaction is structured in such a way that it suits their needs
Wing and Gould 1979; Schilbach 2016a).
In short, several important theories on autism have advanced
ur understanding in crucial facets of the condition; however, there
s still no established uniﬁed account, which could explain social
nd sensory aspects of autism in the context of their inherent inter-
elationship. In fact, it has even been suggested that a single theory
ight be intractable (Happé, 2003; Happé et al., 2006; Gallagher
nd Varga, 2015). However, recent developments centered around
he idea of the human brain organized around principles of
ayesian inference and predictive coding have recently refueled
nterest in a unifying account of autism: For instance, Pellicano
nd Burr (2012), adopted a standpoint to argue that non-social
eatures of autism might be explained in reference to attenuated
ayesian priors (so-called hypo-priors), which suggests that previ-
us experiences might be less important when processing current
ensory input for individuals with autism. This hypothesis pre-
icts the more accurate and acute perception in autism, driven
rimarily by perceptual evidence as opposed to prior knowledge,
s well as the sense of being overwhelmed by this information,
hich is commonly reported by individuals with autism. The hypo-
riors hypothesis was then reformulated (Friston et al., 2013; Vanive Neuroscience 29 (2018) 168–175 169
Boxtel and Lu, 2013) within the predictive coding scheme, a more
speciﬁc Bayesian account (Mumford, 1992; Friston, 2005; Friston,
2008; Clark, 2013), while considering social aspects of cognition
and behavior as well (Lawson et al., 2014; Van de Cruys et al., 2014).
The predictive coding framework relies on the idea that sen-
sory information is processed hierarchically in levels of increasing
abstraction. In this setting, prediction errors (i.e. the discrepancy
between predictions and incoming information) ascend the pro-
cessing hierarchy for optimizing neural conﬁguration in generating
accurate predictions, which descending the hierarchy, are con-
trasted to sensory input. More concretely, higher levels of the
hierarchy produce predictions, which are tested against the input
information of the immediate lower levels. Propagating only the
prediction error and not the actual incoming information to higher
levels is an efﬁcient and resource-oriented way  of reducing the
bandwidth of the processed information. The neural processes and
computations needed to extract regularities in the environment
can be described in terms of Bayesian inference. In this regard, the
brain is thought to represent information accessed via the sensory
organs in the form of probability densities; these probabilities are
maintained via a combination of already gained experience (so-
called priors) and newly sensed information (evidence). The more
conﬁdence (precision) is placed on the validity of experience the
less the latter is updated in the face of new incoming information.
The ultimate goal of such a predictive system is the effective mini-
mization of the prediction error, through perception, learning and
action (for a comprehensive review of traditional theories and a
future integrative direction in autism research see Bolis et al., under
review).
Such endeavors of developing a more uniﬁed account of autism
are further supported by evidence that social and non-social
domains are not as independent as once might have been assumed
in research practice. For instance, Linkenauger et al. (2012) showed
that deﬁcits of individuals with autism in relating information
about their own bodies’ action capabilities to visual informa-
tion specifying the environment, strongly predicted the degree
of social and communicative difﬁculties. Additionally, MacDonald
et al. (2013) demonstrated that children with autism that showed
weaker motor skills had greater social communicative skill difﬁ-
culties. Moreover, Leekam et al. (2007) linked the distinct sensory
processing in autism with higher-level social processes. Having said
that, focusing on ‘internal’ (i.e. within individual brains) dynamics
has, indeed, yielded informative insights, such as providing insights
into the relevance of a dysbalance of inhibitory/excitatory neuro-
transmission in autism (e.g. Robertson et al., 2016). Additionally,
considering ‘external’ (i.e. collective socio-cultural) dynamics, such
as the role of collaborative morality (Spikins et al., 2016) or social
expectations of others (Jensen et al., 2016), can prove to be cru-
cial in achieving a comprehensive account of autism. However,
studying ‘internal’ and ‘external’ dynamics in isolation and thus
neglecting the dialectics between the individual and the collec-
tive (Vygotsky, 1930–1935/1978; views of Vygotsky and colleagues
in Dafermos, 1930–1935/2002), which are inherently intertwined
across multiple temporal scales (i.e. from evolutionary and cul-
tural to developmental and daily learning processes), might result
in misconstruing the essence of a condition such as autism (Bolis
et al., under review).
More speciﬁcally, Vygotsky and colleagues argued that the
development of the human mind has its origin at the interac-
tion between the individual and society, viewing culture and
social interaction as the major developmental driving forces (e.g.
Vygotsky, 1934/2008; 1930–1935/1978). When it comes to chil-
dren with certain “disabilities”, one of the main propositions of
the so-called cultural historical approach was the recognition of
primary and secondary difﬁculties. It was  suggested that it is not
the primary difﬁculties, which are directly linked to the physi-
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al condition, that are crucial to a child’s development, but rather
he secondary ones, which relate to an exclusion from sociocul-
ural activities, which other children freely participate in. Different
actors can contribute to this, such as unsuitable cultural and
echnological environment or social expectations of others. Inter-
stingly, such lines of thought lend support to alternative avenues
f research and intervention, which will not exclusively target
he person of interest (i.e. an individual with autism in our case),
ut the social environment as well, e.g. via personalizing educa-
ion (Vittorias et al., 2008) or facilitating communication between
eople (Bolis et al., under review), bringing focus back to social
nteraction (Schilbach et al., 2013).
Taken together, we suggest that it may  be the coupling and the
nextricable interplay of sensory and motor functions (within an
ndividual) rather than selective deﬁcits thereof – and whether or
ot a given partner in a social interaction is more or less similar
o the autistic person (at the interpersonal level), which play an
mportant role in the development and manifestation of cardinal
haracteristics of autism.
In this article, we, therefore, review evidence, that addresses the
ntegration of sensory processing and individual as well as inter-
ersonal aspects of action control to suggest that individuals with
igh autistic traits are not ‘blind’ to social information in the envi-
onment, but the extent to which they update their beliefs and
hey are, thus, inﬂuenced by this information when making deci-
ions and executing actions is lower than in individuals with low
utistic traits. Furthermore, we review ﬁndings to suggest that a
ore comprehensive understanding of autism (and other psychi-
tric disorders) will have to rely upon studying it in the context of
cologically valid real-time social interactions as social difﬁculties
re known to be more pronounced (or may  only manifest) under
uch conditions (Schilbach et al., 2013; Schilbach, 2016a). Here, we
ropose that a mismatch in autistic trait-related perceptual abili-
ies across individuals can lead to difﬁculties on a social level and
rieﬂy describe a two-person experimental setup and avenues for
uture research to formally investigate this.
. From action observation to interaction in autism
An important initial suggestion for understanding and studying
he biological basis of autistic symptomatology has been to focus
n the ability of individuals with autism to observe and interpret
ctions in others. With regard to general visual abilities and the idea
f an eagle eye hypothesis some studies have provided evidence for
uperior performance of individuals with autism on visual tasks
Dakin and Frith, 2005). Furthermore, evidence has been found to
ocument an increased reliance on visuospatial information by ASD
ndividuals, which was related to increased parietal brain activa-
ion (e.g. DeRamus et al., 2014). Such differences in visuo-spatial
rocessing have also been related to differences at the level of neu-
otransmission: binocular rivalry, a visual function that is thought
o rely on the balance of excitation/inhibition in visual cortex, has
een shown to be tightly linked to GABAergic signaling in healthy
ontrols, while this link was shown to be completely and specif-
cally absent in autism (Robertson et al., 2016). Also, alterations
f serotonergic functioning have been discussed as a contributory
actor in autism (e.g. Cook and Leventhal, 1996). Interestingly, sero-
onergic modulation is also known to change the balance between
ifferent sources of neural activity in sensory systems (Lottem et al.,
016).
With regard to visual processing of others’ actions, disruptions
n the visual perception of biological motion have been discussed
s a potential hallmark of ASD (Kaiser and Pelphrey, 2012). Here, an
mpaired sensitivity for processing the actions of others (as com-
ared to observing objects) has been demonstrated (e.g. Blake et al.,ive Neuroscience 29 (2018) 168–175
2003; Kaiser et al., 2010). These ﬁndings were also paralleled by
neuroimaging results indicative of atypical neural response pat-
terns to biological motion perception with point-light stimuli (e.g.
Herrington et al., 2007). Such point-light displays are created by
attaching markers to a person’s body and head and then recording
that person’s movements so that only the point-lights are visible (cf.
Johansson, 1973). These stimuli are easily manipulated and predis-
positions to process their social aspects can be inferred by detecting
enhanced behavioral sensitivity to displays of biological motion
relative to animal (Pinto and Shiffrar, 2009), object (Kaiser et al.,
2010) or other kinds of biological motions (Manera et al., 2010,
2011). Importantly, differential responses to point-light displays
of human movement are already observed in typically developing
infants (Yoon and Johnson, 2009), which has been taken to suggest
that biological motion perception relies on an early emerging, evo-
lutionary conserved brain system (Kaiser and Pelphrey, 2012). A
large body of work has demonstrated responses of the so-called
“social brain” to point-light displays of biological motion (for a
review see Blake and Shiffrar, 2007). Here, the posterior superior
temporal sulcus (pSTS) has been discussed as a key component of
the neural system that supports social perception.
Studies of the visual perception of biological motion have, thus,
been thought to provide a window into social dysfunction in ASD.
This was  based upon the idea that autism is related to an early and
initial failure to develop the specialized brain mechanisms for social
perception which, in turn, results in abnormal development and the
phenotypic expression of ASD (Pelphrey et al., 2011). Consequently,
different studies have investigated behavioral responses to point-
light displays of biological motion in individuals with autism. While
some studies do ﬁnd impairments, the overall picture appears to be
rather mixed. Interestingly, several studies have documented that
when asked to verbally describe point-light displays of biological
motion, children and adults with ASD exhibit impairments in emo-
tion perception, but intact action perception (Hubert et al., 2007;
Moore et al., 1997; Parron et al., 2008). Recently, Cusack et al. (2015)
have systematically addressed this question by using an extensive
test battery of point light displays in adult individuals with autism.
Here, it was consistently shown that action perception is intact
when autistic individuals are motivated to perform the relevant
task under controlled conditions. This ﬁnding was  replicated by
von der Lühe et al. (2016), who demonstrated that, when prompted
and explicitly asked to assess point-light displays of individual
and even communicative actions between two agents, participants
with autism do not perform worse than a group of matched con-
trols. Only when the complexity of the task is increased, however,
by including noise signals, do individuals with autism show an
impairment of interpersonal action prediction, i.e. no modulation
in behavioral sensitivity for the detection of a second agent in light
of a ﬁrst agent, who  generates a communicative action, is found.
Interestingly, this ability to predict action sequences across two
agents shows an inverse relationship with increasing autistic traits
across the entire spectrum (von der Lühe et al., 2016).
Apart from the ability to perceive the relevant aspects of the
social environment and their interrelation, it is, of course, impera-
tive to be able to quickly and adaptively generate adequate behavior
to respond to it. In this respect, a recent suggestion has been
that social perception and cognition may  be fundamentally dif-
ferent when we  are actively engaged in interaction with others
as compared to merely observing others. This difference may  be
particularly relevant in autism and has been taken to suggest
that interactive situations rely more heavily on the integration of
perception- and action-based processes (Schilbach et al., 2013).
While a vast literature exists on the behavioral and neural corre-
lates of social observation, much less is known about the behavioral
and neural mechanisms of social interaction (Schilbach, 2015).
D. Bolis, L. Schilbach / Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience 29 (2018) 168–175 171
Fig. 1. Two-person psychophysiology setup: This setup allows for an investigation of the interrelation of sensory and social processes in direct, gaze-based social interaction
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detween two persons (Person A, Person B); blue arrows: incoming sensory informa
nteraction loop mediated by a micro-camera communication system. (For interpre
ersion  of this article.)
In direct social interaction the unconscious imitation of the
ctions of others (often described as mimicry) is a powerful and
biquitous behavior. Facial mimicry, for instance, is thought to
e a form of “physiological linkage” or socio-emotional contagion
etween individuals (Dimberg, 1982; Dimberg et al., 2000) and
ssumed to be of considerable importance for interpersonal com-
unication (Niedenthal et al., 2005; Schilbach, 2016b). Conversely,
lterations of involuntary facial reactions (e.g. due to conditions
esulting in facial paralysis) may  have a detrimental effect on
he quality of interpersonal communication (Cole, 2001; Oberman
t al., 2007). In a series of studies, Schilbach and colleagues inves-
igated the behavioral and neural correlates of facial mimicry by
sing anthropomorphic virtual characters that showed either self-
r other-directed facial expressions (e.g. smiling) as compared to
rbitrary facial movements (e.g. puckering; Schilbach et al., 2006;
ojzisch et al., 2006; Schilbach et al., 2008). In these studies, it was
hown that attention allocation, as assessed by ﬁxation duration,
as speciﬁcally related to the perception of self-directed stimuli.
MG measurements demonstrated that facial activity was  inﬂu-
nced by the perception of socially relevant facial expressions and
howed spontaneous, involuntary facial responses irrespective of
hether the facial expression was directed towards the observer
r not (Mojzisch et al., 2006).
In a separate fMRI study, it was demonstrated that speciﬁc brain
ctivations are related to the occurrence of involuntary facial move-
ents in human observers in response to the perception of socially
elevant facial expressions shown by perceived others. These acti-
ations comprise but extend beyond classical motor regions (i.e.
ace motor area) and include other regions of the social brain, such
s the mentalizing system. While activity in motor cortex might
elp to generate a representation of the action which may, in fact,
ranslate to mimicking that behavior oneself, involvement of the
entalizing system might contribute to social cognition by pro-
essing the differentiation of self and other. In dyadic interaction
oth mechanisms are crucially important as a facial expression
ight highlight someone else’s internal state, but could also refer
o some object or might be expressive of the assessment of the
is-à-vis behavior or the process of interacting itself. Whether
imicry responses are abnormal in individuals with ASD has been
ubject of long-standing debate. Seminal studies by Heyes and col-
eagues have demonstrated that individuals with ASD, in fact, do
how automatic imitative behavior (e.g. Bird et al., 2007; see also
outhgate and Hamilton, 2008). More recently, Hamilton and co-
orkers (Forbes et al., 2016) showed that individuals with ASD also
how mimicry, but they do not show an enhancement of mimicry
esponses in a gaze-based social context as neurotypical individuals
o; hence providing support for the social top-down response mod-rom non-social stimuli; green arrows: intra-personal processes; red arrows: social
 of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web
ulation (STORM) model of mimicry in autism, in that the mimicry
response is not top-down modulated by social context.
In another series of studies conducted by Schilbach et al. (2010,
2011), an action control paradigm was used, which required that
participants performed spatially congruent or incongruent but-
ton presses to respond to an unpredictable change in the visual
stimulus. In order to investigate the effect of social context on
behavioral and neural mechanisms of action control, the stimulus
type was varied to include both social (face stimulus) and non-
social (geometric shape) stimuli. Using this paradigm it was shown
that the so-called incongruency costs, i.e. longer reaction times
necessary to generate a spatially incongruent as compared to a
congruent response, were signiﬁcantly smaller for the social as
compared to the non-social stimulus in healthy controls. At the
neural level this effect reﬂected by a differential increase of neural
activity in subcortical structures relevant for the habitual perfor-
mance of actions (caudate nucleus) as well as regions involved in
action monitoring (ACC), action preparation (IFG) and social cogni-
tion (dorsomedial prefrontal cortex). These ﬁndings indicate that
even a minimal, gaze-based social context signiﬁcantly and auto-
matically changes the neural networks relevant for action control,
which might explain the effortless and prompt behavioral adapta-
tions that non-autistic individuals make in the presence of others.
As expected, a group of individuals with high-functioning autism
did show incongruency effects, but those were not modulated by
the social context.
While the above described studies are informative, they do not
provide an account of the computational mechanisms that may
underlie differences in behavior and brain activity. As described in
the introduction, recent developments in cognitive neuroscience
have embraced a perspective that describes the brain as a “pre-
diction machine” whose ultimate goal it is to construct a model of
the environment in order to predict the causes of sensory input, to
anticipate future states and to minimize the resulting ‘prediction
error’. Speciﬁc theoretical commitments aside, all these accounts
tend to agree in suggesting that perception in individuals with ASD
may  be more strongly driven by perceptual evidence as compared
to prior knowledge. This may  explain a stronger reliance on percep-
tual input, but may  render ambiguous situations, in which sensory
input is not sufﬁcient to disambiguate, problematic, because they
may  require stronger reliance on prior knowledge. Consequently,
such accounts can be seen to align with suggestions made by Wang
and Hamilton (2012) that autistic symptomatology may  result from
difﬁculties in the context-sensitive, top down modulation of per-
ceptual processing. In order to test, whether autistic traits are, in
fact, related to differences in Bayesian inference, Sevgi et al. (2016)
used computational modeling to investigate autistic trait-related
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ifferences in the weighting of social and non-social information
uring reward-based learning and decision-making. In this study,
t was shown that individuals with higher autistic traits are not
blind’ to social information in the environment and, in fact, do
earn about it, but the extent to which they update their beliefs
nd are, thus, inﬂuenced by this information when making deci-
ions is lower than in individuals with lower autistic traits. This
gain emphasizes that what might be different in autism is not
erely the ability to process social information, but a propensity
o actually use this information when generating actions oneself.
Until today, no consistent neurochemical, neurophysiological,
r neuroanatomical abnormality has been detected that could
e directly used to inform the diagnosis of ASD. Based on the
bove described ﬁndings, it may  be important in future research to
ssess the neural mechanisms of how sensory processing reaches
ortical hubs and inﬂuences decision-making and action control
Sepulcre et al., 2015) in more ecologically valid social situations
Schilbach, 2015, 2016a,b). Here, it will also be important to investi-
ate the relevant motivational mechanisms, which might be key to
nderstanding why and when individuals actually use their social
erceptual skills (e.g. Schilbach et al., 2010). Such studies should
lso include an investigation of the neurochemical basis of social
eward (e.g. Dölen et al., 2013; Dölen 2015) and could address how
ifferences and/or similarities across interacting individuals may
mpact whether individuals are motivated and able to interact with
ne another. Here, clinical intuition and anecdotal evidence sug-
ests that individuals with autism might be more motivated and/or
ble to interact with other individuals with autism (Schilbach,
016a). To investigate these questions systematically, we  have
enerated an experimental platform, in which behavior and its
nderlying computational mechanisms can be assessed individu-
lly and collectively while two persons perform the same task. It is
o the description of this setup that we now turn.
. Two-person psychophysiology and computational
odeling: a framework for studying the interrelation of
ensory and social processes in social interaction
In this section, we present an experimental framework and anal-
sis schemes for future research of multilevel mechanisms of social
nteraction, i.e. from (sub-)individual to interpersonal processes,
nd most importantly their interrelationships. The importance of
onsidering the dialectics between individual and socio-cultural
rocesses, with an emphasis on social interaction, in psychological
nd psychopathological research has been emphasized in the past
e.g. in cultural historical theories; Vygotsky, 1930–1935/1978;
iews of Vygotsky and colleagues in Dafermos, 1930–1935/2002).
owever, due to conceptual and methodological constraints, neu-
opsychiatric research has not until recently addressed these issues
for some recent attempts of the ﬁeld to consider more interac-
ive scenarios see Montague et al., 2002; Schilbach et al., 2006,
010; Pfeiffer et al., 2011; Dumas et al., 2012; Müller et al., 2013;
onvalinka and Roepstorff, 2012; Froese et al., 2014; Dumas et al.,
014b; Bilek et al., 2015). Such studies have been successful in tap-
ing into some intra-, as well as interpersonal aspects of social
nteractions, such as joint attention, imitation, interpersonal syn-
hronization and joint decision-making. In this article, we  have
mphasized the importance of interplay between sensory and
ocial processes for the development and manifestation of cardi-
al characteristics of autism. Consequently, we are now describing
 two-person setup, which allows for a formal investigation of this
nterplay during gaze-based social interaction. In this setup, par-
icipants are sitting opposite to each other, trying to accomplish
erceptual tasks individually, while interacting via gaze behavior in
eal time through a micro-camera communication system. Thisive Neuroscience 29 (2018) 168–175
dual functionality will be pivotal for relating multilevel processes,
ranging from the level of the individual (e.g. observation and reac-
tion to perceptual information; Fig. 1: blue and green arrows) to
the level of the collective (e.g. social interaction loop; Fig. 1: red
arrows).
Crucially, such a setup will enable the consideration of all possi-
ble types of dyads (i.e. dyads consisting of neurotypical persons,
dyads of persons with autism, as well as neurotypical-autistic
dyads). Furthermore, its design allows for using tasks that com-
prise both free viewing and strictly structured tasks that can be
performed individually, cooperatively or competitively. This com-
promise will allow for formal interpretation of the data, while
preserving adequate degrees of ecological validity. To this end, the
two-person setup transparently obtains high-resolution empirical
data via infrared eye-trackers, micro-cameras, biological motion
sensors and (electro-)physiological recorders, thus, providing mul-
tiple behavioral and (electro-)physiological readouts, such as gaze
position, facial expression, heart rate variability and brain activity.
Collection of biological measurements will enable the speciﬁcation
of lower level biological mechanisms, such as genetic and epi-
genetic mechanisms, while consideration of cultural factors, e.g.
through priming or targeted selection of participants, might allow
for touching upon higher level processes at the level of interper-
sonal exchange. Such a multi-level approach could complement
enactivist and multi-scale approaches (e.g. De Jaegher and Di Paolo,
2007; Froese et al., 2011; Dumas et al., 2014c), as well as facilitate
an integration of seemingly disparate perspectives (e.g. Frith, 1996;
Gordon, 2016; Harris, 2016).
Importantly, the acquisition of high dimensional two-person
data sets will allow for multi-level analyses via advanced compu-
tational methods (e.g. Bayesian and cross-recurrence approaches;
Montague et al., 2012; Stephan and Mathys, 2014; Marwan et al.,
2007). Firstly, intra-individual processes (Fig. 1; green arrows)
could be modelled on the basis of Bayesian integration (Fig. 2a).
Here, studying mechanisms for combining non-social (Fig. 1; blue
arrows) with social (Fig. 1; red arrows) information will be mostly
relevant (see Sevgi et al., 2016). More speciﬁcally, non-social infor-
mation could take the form of perceptual stimuli, while social
information may  be constituted by both individual social cues,
such as other person’s gaze, and collective parameters, such as
interpersonal coupling. Secondly, inter-individual processes (Fig. 1;
red arrows) could be modelled on top of intra-individual ones
(Fig. 1; blue and green arrows) via an intersubjective Bayesian
analysis (Fig. 2b; Bolis et al., under review). The latter scheme
aims at modeling both individual mechanisms (orange boxes;  e.g.
from neurobiological to cognitive-behavior levels) and processes
of collective behavior (green box; e.g. joint decision making and
interpersonal synchronization). More concretely, in Fig. 2b,  and 
symbolize individual beliefs and conﬁdence placed on these beliefs
respectively. The latter are translated and interlinked on a collective
level of description via transformative (e.g. q and ω) and coupling
parameters (e.g. ), resulting in observable activity (for more details
see Bolis et al., under review).
Everyday life scenarios could be linked and potentially be stud-
ied in relevance to such kind of mechanisms. To make this point
more intuitive, let us imagine two simple examples. First, let us
imagine a lady, Penelope, who is planning to go out for dinner, being
still unsure about whether she needs to wear a coat or not. Thus, she
is opening the window and is feeling a cool breeze, which makes
her thinking that it might be cold out tonight. However, people in
the city are all very lightly dressed this night. After a look down the
street, Penelope is not sure that wearing a coat would be a good
idea after all and decides to leave her coat at home. What might
have happened in this case is that Penelope combined social (i.e.
other people’s behavior) with non-social (i.e. perceptual) informa-
tion for deciding on her dilemma. Eventually, going out without
D. Bolis, L. Schilbach / Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience 29 (2018) 168–175 173
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aig. 2. (a) An example of statistically optimal Bayesian integration (green) between
ubjective Bayesian analysis for capturing both individual mechanisms (orange bo
nder  review). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, t
er coat might have come (not surprisingly from a Bayesian per-
pective) as a result of placing greater conﬁdence on one (i.e. here
ocial) versus the other (i.e. non-social) clue. Second, let us imag-
ne two friends having a euphoric conversation over the phone on
 pleasantly sunny day. Shortly before they ﬁnish the call, subtle
erturbations of the telecommunication line are resulting in minor
ignal delays. However minor these delays are, the two friends,
eing unaware of this fact, are both left with a bitter feeling, at
he end of the call. What might have happened here is that the
trength of their interpersonal coupling during communication (a
ollective parameter) has been so negatively affected, that the ini-
ially positive impression of sunshine (perceptual information) was
utweighed.
. Conclusions
In this article, we have emphasized the importance of study-
ng sensory-motor integration at the individual as well as at the
yadic level to more fully understand sensory and social aspects of
utism. This line of research parts from more traditional theories,
hich have focused on speciﬁc cardinal aspects of autism that fall
ither into the social realm, such as social motivation, or a non-
ocial domain, such as central coherence, while being restricted
o the level of the individual. In order to extend those previous
ttempts of investigating the integration of sensory and social cues
t the individual level, recent developments of predictive coding
ccounts appear most promising and allow for an investigation of
he computational mechanisms of autistic trait-related differences
n social cognition. Furthermore, we have reviewed empirical evi-
ence, which indicates that autistic individuals might not face the
reatest difﬁculties during passive observation of either social or
on-social stimuli, but rather when it comes to real-time inter-
ction, which make cue integration necessary and the generation
f adequate behavioral responses in the context of ongoing and
eciprocal social interactions. Taking social interaction seriously,
owever, we believe, also means that hypotheses and empirical
tudies to test them will have to go beyond the individual as the
evel of analysis. Here, an important objective will be to explain
ow processes of interpersonal coordination can emerge from and
re reciprocally connected to the functioning of individual sensory-
otor processes. In order to realize such truly social studies in
utism (and other psychiatric disorders), we have developed a two-
erson setup, which allows for the study of mechanisms at both
he individual and the collective level during real-time social inter-
ction. This development opens up completely new avenues for
utism research and might help to arrive at a more comprehensivesocial (blue) and social information (red). (b) A schematic representation of inter-
nd processes of collective behavior (green box); adjusted from Bolis et al., 2015;
der is referred to the web  version of this article.)
understanding of how exactly autism might be neither an exclu-
sively sensory nor an exclusively social condition.
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